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UN-INSURING DIRECT AcTIoNs AGAINST INSURANCE CoMPANEs
IN MIssissippi: State Farm MutualAutomobile
Insurance Company v. Eakins
Joseph Kyle Fulcher*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Mississippi Supreme Court briefly ended Mississippi's longstanding pro-
hibition of direct actions against insurance companies in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Eakins ("Eakins T").1 In Eakins I, a judgment credi-
tor in a tort action brought a garnishment proceeding against an automobile lia-
bility insurer to recover damages.' The court, in dicta, through Justice McRae,
overruled leading cases in Mississippi law that prohibited direct actions against
insurance companies.3 It then stated that injured parties should join insurance
companies in a declaratory judgment action prior to trial so that coverage ques-
tions can be resolved initially, and judicial economy can be preserved." Shortly
after Eakins I was decided, the court withdrew the opinion and replaced it with a
second opinion ("Eakins IF').' In Eakins II, the majority did not discuss the pos-
sibility of direct actions, but the dissent (authored by Justice McRae) continued
to advocate that injured parties should join insurance companies in a declaratory
judgment action prior to trial to resolve coverage issues and promote judicial
economy.*
This Note will first discuss the current law regarding theories of liability, direct
action statutes, no action clauses, the application of direct action laws in foreign
jurisdictions, and the application of state direct action laws in federal courts. It
will then review the history of Mississippi's law on direct actions against insur-
ance companies. Finally, it will discuss how Eakins I briefly changed
Mississippi's law on direct actions against insurance companies, how Eakins II
responded to the change, and how Mississippi should enact a direct action statute
or procedural rule to clear up the confusion created by Eakins I and Eakins II.
* The author would like to thank Professor William H. Page for his guidance, time, and effort during the prepa-
ration of this Note.
1. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Eakins, No. 96-CT-00034-SCT, 1998 WL 852920 (Miss. Dec. 10,
1998), opinion withdrawn and superseded by State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Eakins, 748 So. 2d 765 (Miss.
1999). The withdrawn opinion, Eakins I, is on file at the Mississippi College Law Review office.
2. Eakins L 1998 WL 852920 at *3.
3. Id. at "4.
4. Id,.
5. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Eakins, 748 So. 2d 765 (Miss. 1999).
6. See id. Justice McRae wrote the majority opinion in Eakins I and the dissent in Eakins 1H; both advocate
allowing direct actions.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
II. DIRECT ACTIONS AGAINST INSURERS BY INJURED PERSONS
A. Direct Actions Absent a Direct Action Statute
Traditionally, injured persons could not sue insurance companies directly
because there was no privity of contract.7 Injured persons, as third party
claimants, were considered incidental beneficiaries who were strangers to the
insurance contract.' In order for a person to sue an insurance company directly
he must be an intended third party beneficiary.9 To be considered an intended
third party beneficiary, a third party's rights must spring from the terms of the
insurance contract and the third party must show that the contract provisions
breached were included for his benefit.1 0 Thus, normally, in order to bring a
direct action against an insurer, an injured party must first obtain a judgment
against the insured as to liability and become a judgment creditor prior to pro-
ceeding against the policy proceeds as an assignee of the insured's rights."
Although the general rule is that a claimant may not bring a direct action
against an insurer (without being a judgment creditor of the insured) simply by
asserting that he is a third party beneficiary under the insured's insurance poli-
cy,12 a claimant can bring a direct action against an insurer under the third party
beneficiary theory in some limited ways. 3 A claimant can receive third party
beneficiary status under the terms of a state direct action statute" and under the
terms of a "no action clause" in an insurance policy.'"
"No action clauses" are phrases in insurance contracts that purport to forbid a
claimant from joining an insurance company as a party in any action against the
insured in order to determine the insured's liability. 6 "In modem practice, where
many direct action statutes exist and the law is less concerned with privity than it
was in the past, 'no action' clauses tend to have less strict wording and often
function to specify the preconditions which must be met in order for a direct
action to be brought; this trend reflects the public policy that encourages pay-
ments to injured parties.""
No action clauses usually do not prohibit direct actions by third parties. 8
Instead, they state that certain conditions must be met before a third party may
bring an action against the insurer. 9 These conditions usually require a third
7. 44 AM. JuR. 2D Insurance § 1445 (1982).
8. William V. Walter & Michael V. Cory, Jr., The Circumvention of Mississippi s Prohibition of Direct
Actions, 66 Miss. L.J. 493,498 (1997).
9. See Cowley v. Texas Snubbing Control, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D. Miss. 1992).
10. Walter & Cory, supra note 8, at 498-99.
11. Thomas E Segalla & Richard J. Cohen, Direct Actions-Current Developments, 20 no. 9 INS. LITIG. REP.
411 (May 15, 1998).
12. Id. at 411.
13. See generally, Walter & Cory, supra note 8.
14. 46A C.J.S. Insurance § 1409 (1993).
15. Segalla & Cohen, supra note 1, at 411.
16. Id.
17. 7 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 104:2 (3d ed. 1999).
18. Segalla & Cohen, supra note 11, at 411.
19. Id.
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party to first obtain a judgment against the insured before filing an action against
the insurer.2" Therefore, "[a] 'no action' clause has the dual purpose of confer-
ring a right upon the injured party and protecting the insurer against merifless
claims."'"
Usually an injured party's right to sue an insurer is contingent upon the injured
party first obtaining a judgment against the insured and therefore receiving third
party beneficiary status as a judgment creditor.22 Rule 18 allows for the joinder
of two claims whenever one is contingent on the other.23 However, courts have
rejected the argument that Rule 18 allows an injured party to join a claim against
the insured with a contingent claim against the insurer.' Alternatively, when
insurers have revealed the indemnity relationship by joining the injured party and
the insured in a declaratory judgment action to determine coverage of the
insured, the courts have split on whether to allow the injured party to counter-
claim directly against the insurance company.2
B. Direct Actions Under Direct Action Statutes
Because direct actions against insurance companies are generally not permitted
at common law, there usually must be a statute that authorizes them. 6 Such
statutes, generally referred to as direct action statutes, have been deemed consti-
tutionally permissible.27 Usually such-statutes allow the injured party to proceed
directly against the liability insurer or file suit against the insurer if a judgment
against the insured is not paid.28
"Direct action statutes reflect the public policy principle that although insur-
ance policies are generally issued to specific insured(s), they are in truth issued
for the benefit of all persons injured through the negligence of that/those
insured(s)." The public policy reasons for having direct action statutes are usu-
ally found in the legislative history of the statutes." However, many argue that
direct action statutes should not be allowed because an injured party should first
have to prove the liability or negligence of the insured before being able to claim
damages directly from the insurer.3
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 18 (emphasis added).
24. See 6A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACnCE AND PROCEDURE § 1594 (1990).
25. Id.
26. 7 CotUcH ON INSURANCE § 104:2 (3d ed. 1999).
27. 44 Am. Jt. 2Dlnsurance § 1445 (1982).
28. Id.
29. Segalla & Cohen, supra note i1, at 411.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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Although Mississippi does not have a direct action statute, Alabama,3"
Arkansas,' Connecticut," Florida, Georgia," Louisiana,' New York," Ohio,'
Oregon," Rhode Island," Vermont, 2 and Wisconsin ' do." Some states have
comprehensive direct action statutes. For example, the Louisiana direct action
statute states:
[S]uch action may be brought against the insurer alone, or against both the
insured and the insurer jointly and in solido .... This right of direct action shall
exist whether or not the policy of insurance sued upon was written or delivered
in the State of Louisiana and whether or not such policy contains a provision
forbidding such direct action, provided the accident or injury occurred within
the State of Louisiana .... It is the intent of this Section that any action
brought under the provisions of this Section shall be subject to all of the lawful
conditions of the policy or contract and the defenses which could be urged by
the insurer to a direct action brought by the insured, provided the terms and con-
ditions of such policy or contract are not in violation of the laws of this state.'
Louisiana's direct action statute clearly states when a third party may join an
insurer (in the initial suit determining liability), whether the insured must be
joined in the action, and when the right to bring the direct action exists.'
Other states have taken a different approach from Louisiana by creating limited
direct action statutes. 7 Limited direct action statutes apply to a particular type of
liability or policy.'" For example, Alabama has a limited direct action statute that
applies when a defendant is exempt from liability under sovereign immunity. 9
Arkansas has a limited direct action statute that only applies when the defendant
is a non-profit corporation.50 Florida has a limited direct action statute that
requires all injured parties to first obtain a judgment against the insured before
proceeding directly against the insurer.51 Georgia has a limited direct action
statute that applies only to common carriers or motor contract carriers52
Tennessee has a limited direct action statute that applies only in uninsured
motorist cases.3
32. ALA. CODE § 33-1-25 (1975).
33. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-210 (Michie 1987).
34. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-321 (West 1992).
35. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4136 (West 1996).
36. GA. CODE ANN. § 46-7-12 (1996).
37. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (West 1995).
38. N.Y. INS. LAw § 3420 (McKinney 1998).
39. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2721.03 (Anderson 1999).
40. OR. R. STAT. § 742.031 (1998).
41. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-7-2 (1956).
42. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 841, 842 (1947).
43. Wis. STAT. §§ 632.24, 803.04 (1995).
44. Segalla & Cohen, supra note I1, at 411.
45. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (West 1995).
46. See id
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Although direct action statutes allow a cause of action, it must be remembered
that they do not create absolute liability against the insurer.5 4 The claimant under
a direct action statute must still establish liability on the part of the insured and
coverage on the part of the insurer in order to recover.
5 1
C. Applying the Direct Action Laws of Foreign Jurisdictions
Following the rule that the procedural law of a forum governs an existing law-
suit in that forum, some courts in states that do not permit direct actions against
insurance companies have refused to permit a direct action against an insurance
company even though the accident occurred in a state that statutorily allowed
direct -actions." There is also authority that the joinder of the insured with the
insurer in one action is proper when the laws of the forum state authorize it even
though the insurance policy, which was valid in the state where it was executed,
required that the injured party first obtain a judgment against the insured. 7
Generally, whether or not a foreign direct action statute will be applied
depends on the conflict of laws rules of the forum state., Usually, the conflict of
laws rules require a determination of whether the direct action statute is substan-
tive or procedural in nature in order to decide whether to apply the foreign
statute." Several cases have held that a foreign direct action statute was proce-
dural in nature and thus not applicable to an action in the forum.' One case stat-
ed that venue requirements in a state's direct action statute prohibit the statute
from being used in other forums." Still, another case held that venue require-
ments are themselves procedural in nature and do not prevent the extraterritorial
application of a direct action statute that is otherwise substantive in nature. 2
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. McArthur v. Maryland Cas. Co., 186 So. 305 (Miss. 1939).
57. 18 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 74:549 (2d rev. ed. 1983) (citing Robbins v. Short, 165 So. 512 (La. App.
1936)).
58. See Robert A. Brazener, Annotation, Extraterritorial Applications of Statute Permitting Injured Person
To Maintain Direct Action Against Tortfeasors Automobile Liability Insurer, 83 A.L.R. 3d 338 (1978) (empha-
sis added).
59. Id.
60. See Pearson v. Globe Indem. Co., 311 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding that the Louisiana direct action
statute could not be the basis of an action against an insurer in Mississippi even though the accident occurred in
Louisiana); Wells v. Am. Employers' Ins. Co., 132 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1942) (holding that even though the acci-
dent occurred in Lousiana, the policy was issued in Louisiana, and the policy covered a resident in Louisiana,
the procedural laws of Texas controlled since the action was brought in Texas); Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Prudence Mut. Cis. Co., 166 N.E.2d 316 (111. App. 1960) (holding that Wisconsin's direct action statute was
procedural in nature and, therefore, had no extraterritorial effect); Davis v. Furlong, 328 N.W2d 150 (Minn.
1983) (holding that in the case of an action being brought in Minnesota for an accident in Wisconsin, the trial
court's order allowing the joinder of the insurer as a defendant under Wisconsin's direct action statute was erro-
neous in light of Minnesota's common law prohibition of direct actions against an insurer); Cook v. State Farm
Mut. Ins. Co., 128 So. 2d 363 (Miss. 1961) (holding that the Louisiana direct action statue was procedural and
remedial and, therefore, the law of the forum, Mississippi, would apply).
61. See Morton v. Maryland Cas. Co., 151 N.E.2d 881 (N.Y. 1955) (limiting the scope of the Louisiana
direct action statute to certain parishes in Louisiana).
62. See Posner v. Travelers Ins. Co., 244 F. Supp. 865 (N.D. I1. 1965) (holding that a provision in the
Wisconsin direct action statute which purported to limit the scope of the statute to actions in Wisconsin courts
would not prevent a court in Illinois from entertaining an action based on the Wisconsin statute).
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Labeling a foreign direct action statute "substantive" in nature does not mean
that it will be applied by a forum court, though; it simply means that the foreign
direct action statute can be applied if the forum court's conflict of laws rules
allow it.' One court held that a substantive characterization of a foreign direct
action statute directly implies that the foreign statute should apply in the forum."'
But another court, recognizing a foreign direct action statute as substantive,
refused to apply it in the forum on the grounds that public policy of the forum
prohibited it."
Il. THE HISTORY OF DIRECT ACTIONS IN MISSISSIPPI
A. State Courts in Mississippi
In a long line of cases in a variety of settings, the Mississippi Supreme Court
has repeatedly faced the issue of direct actions against insurers., In 1902,
Herrin v. Daly declared that evidence concerning liability insurance coverage
was not admissible at trial.6" Later, the court refused to permit direct actions
under foreign direct action statutes.6 Next, the court was faced with whether
privity of contract existed between an injured party and their own insurer when
the injured party was suing under an uninsured motorist provision.'
63. See Brazener, supra note 58.
64. See Shapiro v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 234 F. Supp. 41 (N.D. Ga. 1963) (holding that the foreign direct
action statute was substantive in nature and created a separate and distinct cause of action against the insurer
and that the court was bound to apply the foreign direct action statute as lex loci delicti).
65. See Reishus v. Maryland Cas. Co., 411 F2d 776 (7th Cir. Iil. 1969) (holding that the Full Faith and
Credit clause of the United States Constitution did not require Illinois to apply a Wisconsin direct action statute
because it violated Illinois public policy of denying direct actions against insurance companies).
66. See infra § I11.
67. Herrin v. Daly, 31 So. 790 (Miss. 1902). In Daly, the court stated that any evidence concerning insurance
coverage "could not conceivably throw any light on the issue, and could have no other tendency than to seduce
a verdict on the ground that an insurance company, and not the defendants, would be affected." Id. at 791.
68. In 1938, the Mississippi Supreme Court first faced the question of whether an insured should be allowed
to sue an insurer directly. Burkett v. Globe Indem. Co., 181 So. 316 (Miss. 1938). The court held that the
plaintiff, who was injured in an automobile wreck while on the job, was allowed to sue the insurer of the owner
of the vehicle directly under Louisiana's Direct Action Statute. Id. In explaining its decision, the court stated,
"[l]n the light of our decisions and what we consider to be the weight of authority... we cannot close the doors
of our courts to one of our own citizens." Id. at 319. But, in 1939, when confronted again with whether to
apply Louisiana's Direct Action Statute in Mississippi, the court ruled that since there was no privity of contract
between a third party and an insurer, an insurer could not be sued directly by a third party. See Walter & Cory,
supra note 8, at 495 (citing Cook v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 128 So. 2d 363 (Miss. 1961); (McArthur v.
Maryland Cas., 186 So. 305 (Miss. 1939)).
69. In Hodges v. Canal Insurance Co., 223 So. 2d 630, 634 (Miss. 1969), the court found "it... obvious
that the appellant [could] bring a direct action against .. .her own insurer." Two years later, the court, in
Harthcock v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 248 So. 2d 456 (Miss. 1971), affirmed Hodges and
held that an insured could file a direct action against his or her insurance company under an uninsured
motorists provision without first filing suit against the uninsured motorist. The court reasoned that since bring-
ing an action against the insurer would allow the insured an opportunity to establish the liability of the unin-
sured, no need existed for the insured to first file an action against the uninsured to determine liability. Id. at
460. See also Famed v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 263 So. 2d 790 (Miss. 1972). Furthermore, the court stated that
the insured could not join an action against the uninsured motorist with an action against the insurer because
one action was in tort and the other in contract and Mississippi law did not allow joinder of tort and contract
actions. Harthcock, 248 So. 2d at 460.
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In the 1980's, the Mississippi Supreme Court repeatedly ruled that direct
actions against insurance companies by third parties were not allowed.7" The
court stated in Westmoreland v. Raper, "We have on numerous occasions had the
opportunity to provide for the joinder of the defendant and insurer in a direct
action and we have steadfastly refused to do so. That refusal continues."7 In
Westmoreland, the plaintiff brought one action against both the insurer and the
insured." The following was the plaintiff's argument:
(1) adoption of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure ended the prohibition
against direct actions by third parties on insurance policies and the prohibition
against the mention of liability insurance in trials; and (2) a third party may
maintain a direct action against an insurance company on a theory of contract as
the "third party beneficiary" to the agreement between the insured and his
insurer.
3
The court dismissed the plaintiff's arguments stating that "Mississippi law has
long held that direct actions by third parties on insurance policies are prohibited
absent specific statutory authority,"74 and "our fundamental law [is] that where
no action exists at common law, a statute must create one. Where there is no
privity of contract, a suit for breach of contract cannot be maintained."' The
court also stated that third party beneficiary status is contingent upon a plaintiff
first obtaining a judgment against the tortfeasor and that an injured party must
receive third party beneficiary status from the insurance agreement since con-
tract rights spring from the contract itself.
76
Westmoreland clearly established Mississippi's law on the third party benefi-
ciary theory when the court pointed out that claims by third parties under the
third party beneficiary theory were not convincing and lacked merit." The court
explained that "[tihe benefit to a third party contemplated by insurance policies
is contingent upon a judgment being awarded for which the insurance company
may or may not be liable under the terms of the agreement."7 " The plaintiff in
Westmoreland cited Bussey v. Shingleton, s a Florida case, as authority that third
parties should be allowed to sue insurers directly under third party beneficiary
status.80 The court, in dismissing the plaintiff's arguments, recognized that
70. See Westmoreland v. Raper, 511 So. 2d 884 (Miss. 1987); Clark v. City of Pascagoula, 507 So. 2d 70
(Miss. 1987); Joseph v. Tennessee Partners, Inc., 501 So. 2d 371 (Miss. 1987) (overruled on other grounds by
Churchill v. Pearl River Basin, 619 So. 2d 900 (Miss 1993)); Smith v. City of West Point, 475 So. 2d 816 (Miss.
1985).
71. estmoreland, 511 So. 2d at 884.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 885 (citing McNeal v. McNeal, 254 So. 2d 521 (Miss. 1971) (abrogated on other grounds by Burns
v. Bums, 518 So. 2d 1205 (Miss 1988)); Cook v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 128 So. 2d 363 (Miss. 1961);
McArthur v. Maryland Cas., 186 So. 305 (Miss. 1939).
75. Westmoreland, 511 So. 2d at 885.
76. Id. at 885-86. (citing Maness v. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 416 So. 2d 979 (Ala. 1982); Bums
v. Washington Sav., 171 So. 2d 322 (Miss. 1965)).
77. Westmoreland, 511 So. 2d at 885-86.
78. Id. (citing Maness v. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 416 So. 2d 979 (Ala. 1982)).
79. 211 So. 2d 593 (Fla. App. 1968).
80. Westmoreland, 5 11 So. 2d at 885.
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Florida law permits direct actions under the third party beneficiary theory but
stated that this is the minority view and has no bearing on Mississippi law.'
Initially, courts applying Mississippi law in the 1990's followed Westmoreland
in forbidding direct actions by third parties against insurance companies.82
Furthermore, the courts following the Westmoreland proscription consistently
stated that injured parties did not have third party beneficiary status and that
third parties must obtain a judgment against the tortfeasor before bringing an
action against the tortfeasor's insurer.'
B. Federal Courts in Mississippi
Federal courts in Mississippi have consistently refused to allow direct actions
against insurance companies. ' The federal courts have applied Mississippi's law
on direct actions in nearly every case and, in most cases, have cited the
Westmoreland court's statement that third parties have no rights against insurance
companies because they are not third party beneficiaries."
81. Id.
82. See generally Cowley v. Texas Snubbing Control, Inc., 812 F Supp. 1437 (S.D. Miss. 1992); Byrd v.
Principal Cas. Ins. Co., 781 F Supp. 1177 (S.D. Miss. 1991); Jordan v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 774 F Supp.
424 (S.D. Miss. 1991); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. U.S.F.&G., 756 F Supp. 953 (S.D. Miss. 1990); Hunt v.
Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 568 So. 2d 253 (Miss. 1990).
83. See generally Cowley v. Texas Snubbing Control, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D. Miss. 1992); Byrd v.
Principal Cas. Ins. Co., 781 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D. Miss. 1991); Jordan v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 774 F Supp.
424 (S.D. Miss. 1991); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. U.S.F.&G., 756 E Supp. 953 (S.D. Miss. 1990); Hunt v.
Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 568 So. 2d 253 (Miss. 1990).
84. Federal courts in Mississippi first faced the direct action issue in Logan v. Aetna Casualty and Surety
Co., 309 R Supp. 402 (S.D. Miss. 1970). In Logan, the court held that an injured party could not directly sue
his own insurance company for uninsured motorist benefits until he had filed an action to establish the liability
of the uninsured motorist. Id. at 407. The court distinguished Hodges, a case in which the Mississippi Supreme
Court had allowed an injured party to directly sue his insurance company for uninsured motorist benefits, by
stating that Hodges dealt with different circumstances. Id. Hodges dealt with an injured party suing the tort-
feasor and the tortfeasor's insurance provider along with his own insurance provider, however, the tortfeasor
could not be brought under Mississippi jurisdiction and the tortfeasor's insurer had disclaimed all liability. Id.
Therefore, the Logan court held that only when a tortfeasor is unknown or outside the jurisdiction of the applic-
able courts are direct actions against uninsured motorist insurers permissible. Id.
After Logan, federal courts did not face another direct action issues until after the Westmoreland decision by
the Mississippi Supreme Court. In the first direct action case in a Mississippi federal court after Westmoreland,
the court cited Westmoreland and held that "Mississippi does not allow direct actions against insurers. The
basis of this rule disallowing direct actions is that a third party has no right which can be asserted against an
insurer." Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. U.S.F&G., 756 E Supp. 953, 957 (S.D. Miss. 1990). The court strengthened
its view against direct actions in Jordan v. State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Co., 774 F Supp. 424 (S.D.
Miss. 1991). In Jordan, the court held that Mississippi law has "steadfastly refused and would continue to
refuse to permit a direct action against a liability insurer." Id. at 426. The court cited Westmoreland and specif-
ically pointed out that Mississippi law does not allow suits by third parties against insurers under the third party
beneficiary theory. Id.
After Jordan, the federal courts in Mississippi continued to cite Westmoreland and prohibit direct actions.
See Crum v. Mississippi Mun. Serv. Co., No. Civ. A. 3:97CV212-D-A, 1998 WL 378333, (N.D. Miss. Mar. 30,
1998); Cowley v. Texas Snubbing Control, Inc., 812 F Supp. 1437 (S.D. Miss. 1992); Byrd v. Principal Cas.
Ins., 781 F Supp. 1177 (S.D. Miss. 1991). In Cowley v. Texas Snubbing Control, Inc., 812 F Supp. at 1446, the
court again concluded that an injured party is prohibited to assert a claim directly against an insurer. The court
further explained that "persons injured by an insured are not third-party beneficiaries of the insurance contract
before a judgment is obtained against the insured, in the absence of a statute or contractual provision establish-
ing that third party's status as an intended third-party beneficiary." Id. at 1445. In Crum v. Mississippi
Municipal Service Co., a 1998 case, the court, citing Westmoreland, refused to permit a direct action, but stated
that "it is possible that these plaintiffs might in the future acquire the right to sue these defendants directly,
either as third party beneficiaries or as assignees or subrogors" (after first obtaining a judgment against the
insured). Crum, 1998 WL 378333, at *3.
85. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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IV INSTANT CASE
A. Facts
Bridget Eakins, Doris Winters, and Duane Quarles ("Plaintiffs") were injured
in an automobile accident involving a vehicle driven by Christopher Jobe
("Jobe") and owned by Ronald Chester ("Chester").", The Plaintiffs sued Jobe."
State Farm, Chester's insurer, hired David Norquist ("Norquist") to defend Jobe
under a reservation of rights." The Plaintiffs were awarded a judgment by the
trial court, but State Farm refused to pay the judgment." Plaintiffs then filed a
writ of garnishment against State Farm.9" State Farm filed an answer that
claimed Jobe had used Chester's car without permission and therefore, was not
covered by Chester's State Farm policy.9" The trial court held that State Farm's
"non-permissive use" defense was untimely and entered a judgment against State
Farm.
92
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling but stated that the trial
court had arrived at its conclusion for the wrong reasons.93 The court of appeals
held that the trial court erred in forbidding State Farm's non-permissive use
claim since State Farm had only provided counsel for Jobe and was not a party to
the original action. The court of appeals also held that neither Mississippi case
law nor statutory law had yet decided a presumption of permission regarding
non-permissive use of a motor vehicle. After considering different views from
other jurisdictions the court of appeals decided "that it was better to follow the
rule that 'there exists a presumption that a person driving a motor vehicle does so
with the permission of the insured owner."'" After deciding that State Farm had
not rebutted the presumption of permissive use, the court of appeals affirmed the
judgment against State Farm.97 State Farm appealed and the Mississippi
Supreme Court granted certiorari.9 8
In Eakins I, the Mississippi Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice McRae,
affirmed the court of appeal's decision regarding a presumption of permissive
use of automobiles, but reversed and remanded the case to the trial court to allow
State Farm a chance to rebut the presumption since it was not a party in the origi-
86. Eakins 1, 1998 WL 852920 at *3.
87. Id.
88. Id. A reservation of rights is "a contract (supplementing a liability-insurance policy) in which the
insured acknowledges that the insurer's investigation or defense of a claim against the insured does not waive
the insurer's right to contest coverage later." BLAcK's LAW DICTnONARY 1032 (7th ed. 1999).





94. Id. The court of appeals also held that neither Mississippi statutory nor case law stated whether permis-






MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
nal trial.9 In dicta, the court also stated that insurance coverage questions should
be resolved prior to trial in a declaratory judgment action that joins all parties,
including insurance companies, pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure
57.100
The court granted a motion for rehearing and withdrew the first opinion,
replacing it with Eakins II approximately ten months after Eakins I was decid-
ed.1"1 The Eakins H court held that no presumption of permissive use exists
under Mississippi law and that the court of appeals has the authority to impose
an appeal damages penalty."2 The majority did not mention direct actions in its
opinion but the dissent continued to advocate the use of direct actions in the
form of declaratory judgments in order to further judicial economy."3
B. Reasoning
Eakins I was a five to four en banc decision.' 4 Justice McRae, writing for the
majority, stated that, because State Farm was not a party in the original trial, it
had not been given an opportunity to rebut the presumption of permissive use in
the original trial.' The majority reasoned that since State Farm was not a party,
the trial court's judgment against Jobe could not be res judicata as to State Farm's
liability to the Plaintiffs." 6
The majority then stated that, procedurally, the Plaintiffs should have originally
filed a declaratory judgment action on the issue of coverage and named State
Farm as a party instead of having a trial on the merits and then filing a garnish-
ment proceeding." 7 The majority further stated that the Mississippi Rules of
Civil Procedure are "all encompassing" and allow these types of declaratory
judgment actions to resolve insurance coverage questions and that this process
should be used in order to preserve judicial economy.' The following is the
majority's specific holding:
Allowing an insured or third party beneficiary and the defendant to resolve
insurance coverage questions prior to the trial on the merits is far more fair and
economical to all parties than would be to require the trial on the merits and 3 or
4 years later resolve the questions of coverage and payment of a judgment.
This, however, does not preclude having insurance coverage questions resolved
in a garnishment proceeding. Our pronouncement today will allow both,
although it is preferred that they be disposed of initially."
99. Id.
100. Id. The Supreme Court also affirmed the court of appeals decision regarding statutory damages but
vacated the damages levied since the case was reversed and remanded.
101. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Eakins, 748 So. 2d 765 (Miss. 1999).
102. Id. at 769.
103. Id. at 770-71 (McRae, J., dissenting).
104. Eakins 1, 1998 WL 852920 at *5. Justices McCrae, Sullivan, Pittman, Banks, and Roberts concurred in
the decision and Justices Waller, Prather, Smith, and Mills concurred in part and dissented in part.






2000] Un-Insuring Direct Actions Against Insurance Companies in Mississippi 385
After announcing that direct actions in declaratory judgments were the proper
way to decide coverage issues, the majority proceeded-seemingly in dicta-to
overrule Hunt v. Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Co., 0 Westmoreland v.
Raper,"' and Clark v. City of Pascagoula,"' cases which had prohibited direct
actions against insurance companies."1 3 The majority's only justification for
overruling these cases was judicial economy, that is, allowing direct actions in
declaratory judgment actions would conserve judicial resources."' Although, in
overruling these cases, the court did not specifically state that it would allow
direct actions under the third party beneficiary theory, the court's use of the
phrase, "[a]llowing an insured or third party beneficiary and the defendant . .
implied that it would consider injured parties to be third party beneficiaries." 5
Justice Waller, writing for the dissent, stated, "[U]nder the guise of 'judicial
economy,' the majority overrules Hunt, Westmoreland, and Clark which hold that
a third party may not maintain a direct action against an insurer.""' The dissent
then stated that whether Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 57 allows a party to
join an insurance company as a party to a declaratory judgment action in order to
determine coverage questions was not properly before the court."" The only
issue in question in the case was a post-trial garnishment action and neither party
mentioned Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 57 or declaratory judgment
actions in their briefs.' 8 The dissent argued that the court should not decide on
an issue that would have such a significant impact on insurance law without first
having the benefit of a proper case and briefs to apply the law."9 The dissent
also suggested that the court should wait until a case involving the role of
declaratory judgment actions in resolving direct actions against insurers was
properly before it to decide the issue.'20
Eakins H was also a five to four decision.' 2' The majority in Eakins II consist-
ed of the minority in Eakins I plus the newly-appointed Justice Cobb.' Eakins
I changed Eakins I by holding that there is no presumption of permissive use of
an automobile in Mississippi.'23 More importantly, it did not include any refer-
ence to the holding of the Eakins I majority that allowed direct actions in a
declaratory judgment setting and overruled Hunt, Westmoreland, and Clark.'
Essentially, the Eakins II majority omitted any discussion of direct actions from
110. Hunt v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 568 So. 2d 253 (Miss. 1990).
Ill. Westmoreland v. Raper, 51! So. 2d 884 (Miss. 1987).
112. Clark v. City of Pascagoula, 507 So. 2d 70 (Miss. 1987).
113. Eakins 1, 1998 WL 852920 at *4.
114. Id.
115. Id. at *4 (emphasis added).
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their opinion and replaced the Eakins I majority opinion with the Eakins I dis-
senting opinion. 2' Although the Eakins H majority prevented the allowance of
direct actions from becoming law, Justice McRae continued to advocate allowing
direct actions in his Eakins 11 dissent. 2 Specifically, Justice McRae stated that
direct actions should be allowed under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 57 in
order to further judicial economy, which was the same opinion he advocated in
the Eakins I majority opinion.27
C. Post-Eakins I Interpretations
In Prince v. Louisville Municipal School District,128 a student sued the school
district, football coaches, and the school district's insurers for injuries the student
suffered at football practice."9 The court was faced with the issue of whether
medical payment claimants are intended third party beneficiaries under insur-
ance contracts and have the right to proceed directly against an insurer who
refuses to pay medical benefits from the contract. ' The court held that benefits
from medical payment policies flow directly to third party claimants, and there-
fore, third party claimants are intended beneficiaries with the right to proceed
directly against the insurer." '
After Prince, the Mississippi Supreme Court heard its first post-Eakins I case
dealing with direct actions in a declaratory judgment setting.'32 In Jackson v.
Daley," Jackson filed a wrongful death action against Jefferson Davis County,
Ralph Daley, Charles Smith, and Horace Dyess for the death of his son."" Soon
after filing his complaint, Jackson amended to include U.S.E&G., the county's
insurer, under Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure 19 and 20 to determine cov-
erage questions about the county's insurance policy. 35 The trial court allowed
U.S.F&G. to be joined in a declaratory judgment action against the Defendant.'3
The individuals and the county filed for summary judgment.'37 The individuals'
motions for summary judgment were granted but the county's motion was denied
until insurance coverage questions were decided. ' The plaintiff then filed to
join U.S.F.&G. as a real party in interest 39 since its insured, the county, was the
only party left in the lawsuit. 4 This motion was denied.'
125. Id.
126. Id. at 770-71.
127. Id. at 771.
128. Prince v. Louisville Mun. Sch. Dist., 741 So. 2d 207 (Miss. 1999).
129. Id. at 208-09.
130. Id. at212.
131. Id.
132. Jackson v. Daley, 739 So. 2d 1031 (Miss 1999).
133. Id.




138. Id. at 1034.
139. A "real party in interest" is a "person who will be entitled to benefits of action if successful, that is, the
one who is actually and substantially interested in subject matter as distinguished from one who has only a
nominal, formal, or technical interest in or connection with it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1264 (6th ed. 1990).
140. Daley, 739 So. 2d at 1034.
141. Id.
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At trial the jury ruled for the County and U.S.E&G." 2 The plaintiff appealed
on the ground that the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff's motion to name
U.S.E&G. as a real party in interest." The Mississippi Supreme Court, sitting
en banc, ruled that although the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion to join
U.S.F&G. as a real party in interest, the trial court did allow U.S.F&G. to be
joined for the declaratory judgment action and therefore satisfied the Eakins I
criteria for direct actions by third parties against insurance companies.",
Shortly after Daley, in Titan Indemnity Co. v. Williams, '45 the Mississippi Court
of Appeals applied the Eakins I theory for direct actions in a declaratory judg-
ment setting.'" The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment to determine
whether either of two liability insurance policies of the Hazlehurst Separate
School District provided coverage for the claim of damages against the
District." 7 The chancery court ruled that the policies provided by Titan
Indemnity Company ("Titan") did provide coverage." Titan appealed on the
grounds that declaratory actions were impermissible as direct actions against
insurance companies." 9
The court of appeals, in denying Titan's appeal, summarized the recent change
in Mississippi law as follows:
Mississippi's long-standing prohibition against litigating a claim against an
alleged tortfeasor's liability insurer without first obtaining a judgment against
the insured has been limited in the interests of judicial economy; indeed, a sepa-
rate claim for declaratory judgment, like that filed by Williams, now may be
joined with an action for damages.'I
The court then applied Eakins I and found that, because the case involved lan-
guage in the insurance contract that needed to be clarified in order to determine
the legal position of the parties, Williams' Rule 57 motion for a declaratory judg-
ment was appropriate.'
V ANALYsIs
A. The Court Did Not Properly Address the Issue of Direct Actions in Eakins I.
In Eakins I, the court announced that the correct procedure for resolving insur-
ance coverage questions was to bring a declaratory judgment action joining the
insurer prior to a trial on the merits." 2 The court interpreted Mississippi Rule of
142. Id.
143. Id. The Plaintiff also appealed on many other grounds.
144. Id.
145. Titan Indern. Co. v. Williams, 743 So. 2d 1020 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1022.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1022-23. Titan based its appeal on Westmoreland but the court noted that Westmoreland was over-
ruled by Eakins I.
150. itan Indem. Co., 743 So. 2d at 1023.
151. Id.
152. Eakins 1, 1998 WL 852920 at *4.
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Civil Procedure 57 to allow for this type of pre-trial declaratory judgment
action."s The court appeared to be limiting its allowance of direct actions solely
to declaratory judgment actions. However, by overruling Hunt, Westmoreland,
and Clark, historic cases in Mississippi law that prohibited direct actions against
insurance companies in all settings including declaratory judgment actions,"5 ' the
court implied that Mississippi's prohibition against direct actions was no longer
absolute in any area. In fact, Eakins I may be interpreted to allow direct actions
under many different theories including the third party beneficiary theory since
the court specifically referred to injured parties as third party beneficiaries."'5
The issue before the court in Eakins I was a post-trial garnishment
proceeding." 6 Nevertheless, the court took it upon itself to rule that direct
actions against insurance companies should be allowed by way of a declaratory
judgment action, '57 Ironically, two other states, Utah and Nevada, have already
faced the issue of direct actions by way of declaratory judgments and have held
that it was improper and premature for a claimant to bring a declaratory judg-
ment naming the insurer before obtaining a judgment as to liability against the
insured. ' Before Eakins II superseded Eakins I, Mississippi was the only state
that allowed this type of direct action and the court did so when it was not prop-
erly presented with the issue."59 The dissent in Eakins I correctly observed that
the majority overruled Hunt, Westmoreland, and Clark under the "guise of 'judi-
cial economy"' and that "[t]he determination of whether M.R.C.P. permits a
party to file a declaratory judgment action in an effort to resolve coverage ques-
tions [was] not properly before [the] Court."'  Neither party in Eakins I men-
tioned Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 57 in their briefs."1 Neither party
mentioned the possibility of filing a declaratory judgment in order to determine
coverage issues prior to trial in their briefs. 2 Essentially, the majority chose
Eakins I as the venue to decide an issue not properly presented or briefed." 3
Another problem with Eakins I was that the court interpreted Rule 57, a proce-
dural rule, to allow direct actions although direct actions are a matter of contract.
Insurance policies are contracts between the insured and the insurer. The only
way for the insured to receive benefits from the policy is through the insured's
contract rights under the policy. The only way for a thirdparty to have any rights
153. Id.
154. Hunt v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 568 So. 2d 253 (Miss. 1990); Westmoreland v. Raper, 511 So. 2d
884 (Miss. 1987); Clark v. City of Pascagoula, 507 So. 2d 70 (Miss. 1987).
155. Eakinsl, 1998 WL 852920 at *4.
156. Id. at *3.
157. Id.
158. See Segalla & Cohen, supra note 1I, at 411 (citing Knittle v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 908 P.2d 724
(Nev. 1996) (holding that a declaratory judgment action by an injured party against the insurer presented no jus-
tifiable controversy right for judicial determination while no action to determine the liability of the insured had
been decided); Boyle v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 866 P2d 595 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (holding that it is pre-
mature for an injured party to file a declaratory judgment against the insurer prior to a determination that the
insured was in fact liable)).
159. See Segalla & Cohen, supra note II, at 411 (showing that no other state allows direct actions by way of
declaratory judgments).
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from the insured's insurance policy is for the third party to receive third party
beneficiary status. Third party beneficiary status is obtained traditionally
through direct action statutes, no action clauses, or by becoming a judgment
creditor of the insured. Each of these ways of achieving third party beneficiary
status creates a direct right of action for the claimant against the insurer. Only
then is the claimant given contract rights and allowed to bring a direct action
against the insurer. Under Eakins I, Rule 57 created a right of action for the
claimant against the insurer. By granting the claimant a right of action, the con-
tract rights of the insurance policy are altered by allowing the claimant to achieve
third party beneficiary status. Direct actions under the third party beneficiary
theory, absent a statute, no action clause, or the claimant becoming a judgment
creditor of the insured, have been prohibited for years. No other jurisdiction has
allowed direct actions under the process that Eakins I created. The court, inter-
preting Rule 57 to allow direct actions, effectively changed the law of contracts
and created a right of action for claimants.
The court, because of its unorthodox approach to it decision, may not have
considered all the effects that the Eakins I decision could have on direct actions.
Allowing third parties to bring direct actions can have important effects on insur-
ance, procedural, and contract law. All of the states that allow direct actions
without first obtaining a judgment against the insured to determine liability have
enacted a direct action statute that covers the scope and availability of direct
actions.' In adopting these direct action statutes, state legislatures have consid-
ered all of the implications of allowing direct actions before making a decision
on whether to adopt a direct action statute. The court, in Eakins I, did not have
the benefit of hearing arguments for and against direct actions or hearing differ-
ent public policy considerations.
Ultimately, Eakins H replaced Eakins I. However, the minority in Eakins II
remains just one vote away from reinstating the majority opinion of Eakins L
Indeed, Justice McRae's dissenting opinion in Eakins I indicates the Eakins II
minority will continue to advocate allowing direct actions in the future.
B. The Eakins I Logic Does Not Actually Promote Judicial Economy.
In Eakins I, the court, by allowing a direct action against the insurance compa-
ny, stated, "[W]e are now allowing coverage questions to be resolved prior to trial
and brought in the same lawsuit under Miss. R. Civ. P. 57 in furtherance of the
goals of judicial economy."' The court explained that allowing a plaintiff to
join an insured and an insurer in a Rule 57 declaratory judgment action prior to
any litigation would allow coverage questions to be resolved before a trial on the
merits.16 8 Thus, because there would not have to be a trial on the merits to decide
if the insured was liable, and then a second trial to determine if the insured's
164. See Segalla & Cohen, supra note 1I, at 41 1.
165. Eakins 1, 1998 WL 852920 at *3.
166. Id.
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insurance policy covered the act of the insured, time would be saved. The court
further stated,
Allowing an insured or third party beneficiary and the defendant to resolve
insurance coverage questions prior to the trial on the merits is far more fair and
economical to all parties than would be to require the trial on the merits and 3 or
4 years later resolve the questions of coverage and payment of a judgment.'
The court seemed to reason that a declaratory judgment action would eliminate
the need for an injured party to bring two actions in order to recover. This rea-
soning, however, appears to be flawed. Even if coverage questions were resolved
in the first action, a second tort suit to determine the liability of the insured
would still have to be brought. Judge Southwick addressed this issue in the fol-
lowing statement in his concurring opinion in Titan: M
The unstated next step of Eakins [1], if efficiency is to be encouraged, can only
be to make the same fact-finder for the tort claims be the fact-finder for the cov-
erage questions. It is difficult to see how Eakins [1] actually provides any effi-
ciency without such a rule, since otherwise all that it has done is provide an
option for which of two suits proceeds first.'"
Without Eakins I, if a plaintiff brings a tort suit against an insured and loses at
trial and on appeal, there is no need for a ruling on coverage. "0 With Eakins I, if
the plaintiff brings a declaratory judgment action to determine coverage and the
action results in a judgment for the insured and the insurer, the plaintiff may still
proceed with a tort action against the insured. In such a case, the Eakins I rule
would increase litigation and reduce judicial economy."' Judge Southwick rea-
soned as follows:
What started in Eakins [/] as an effort to avoid a "trial on the merits [on the tort
claims] and 3 or 4 years later resolve the questions of coverage and payment of
a judgment," has become a trial on the merits on the coverage claims and 3 or 4
years later a resolution of the tort claim.'
The only way that the Eakins I "rule" could serve judicial economy would be
to allow the same trier of fact to decide coverage and liability questions in the
same proceeding."73 This way, the court could resolve factual issues regarding
coverage immediately and get the tort case before the jury faster. Consequently,
judicial economy would be served since the plaintiff would have to bring only
one action in order to recover and any subsequent suit three or four years down
the line would not be needed.
167. Id. at *4.
168. Titan Indem. Co. v. Williams, 743 So. 2d 1020, 1027. (Miss Ct. App. 1999).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1027-28.
172. Id. at 1028.
173. Id. at 1029.
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C. Mississippi Needs a Statute or Rule that Properly Addresses
the Direct Action Issue.
Although the Eakins H court ultimately ended Mississippi's allowance of direct
actions, the Eakins I court was willing to hold that direct actions were proper in
Mississippi in a setting that was less than ideal.174 The means by which the
Eakins I court overruled Westmoreland may not have allowed a thorough consid-
eration of the issues that allowing direct actions raise. Since Mississippi's cur-
rent direct action law stands in a state of confusion, now may be the time for the
legislature to consider a statute or rule that offers a global solution to the direct
action problem.
Direct action statutes usually allow an injured party to bring an action directly
against a tortfeasor's insurer by granting the injured party third party beneficiary
status."' Such statutes rest on the determination that insurance policies, although
issued to specific persons, are actually issued for the benefit of all persons who
are injured as a result of the insured's actions. 7 ' Direct action statutes express
the public policy of the state, and in order to interpret a direct action statute, the
statute's legislative history and intent should be considered. 7'
In deciding Eakins I, the court used a procedural rule to create a contract law
establishing a claimant's right to bring a direct action against an insurance com-
pany.78 Although now the Mississippi Supreme Court has taken over the process
of creating and amending the procedural rules and has the power to interpret
rules of procedure,'79 deciding whether to allow direct actions involves substan-
tive choices best made by the legislature. All of the other states that have
addressed the direct action issue and decided to allow a claimant to bring a direct
action without being a judgment creditor have done so by creating some form of
a direct action statute.' 8° Such a statute would more clearly define the law of
direct actions than the approach in Eakins L
Louisiana's direct action statute unambiguously states when, where, and how
direct actions should apply.'81 The court need not interpret procedural rules to
decide if direct actions should be allowed. Other states' limited direct action
statutes outline the specific circumstances in which direct actions are proper-by
negative implication, direct actions are improper in all other circumstances.
Thus, direct action statutes reduce the ambiguity inherent in interpreting proce-
dural rules to allow direct actions.
The Eakins I court was not necessarily wrong in endorsing direct actions, but it
was not in the proper position to decide the issue. If the Mississippi legislature
174. See infra § V(A).
175. 44 Am. JuR. 2olnsurance § 1445 (1982).
176. Segalla & Cohen, supra note 11, at 411.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See generally State v. Blenden, 748 So. 2d 77 (Miss. 1999); Newell v. State, 308 So. 2d 71 (Miss. 1975);
William H. Page, Constitutionalism And Judicial Rulemaking: Lessons From The Crisis in Mississippi, 3 Miss.
C. L. REv. I (1982).
180. See Segalla & Cohen, supra note I1, at 411.
181. See infra § II(B).
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wants to limit direct actions to declaratory judgment proceedings, the legislature
can draft a limited direct action statute expressly granting and limiting all direct
actions to declaratory judgment proceedings.
In the alternative, the court could create a procedural rule by its established
rulemaking procedures that more completely governs direct actions. Such a rule
could require the joinder of an insurer and an insured in one action so that all of
the issues of coverage and liability could be settled in one action. This approach
may press the limits of the court's procedural rulemaking authority, but it would
be preferable to the Eakins I approach.
D. How Will Eakins I and Eakins II Affect Mississippi ' Law Regarding the
Application of Foreign Direct Action Statutes?
Prior to Eakins I, when direct actions against insurance companies were strictly
prohibited under Mississippi law, Mississippi courts were often presented with
the question of whether to apply Louisiana's direct action statute to cases brought
in Mississippi courts.182 The court repeatedly refused to apply Louisiana's direct
action statute, reasoning that it was procedural in nature, and the procedural law
of the forum governed.'83 Before Eakins I, Mississippi had no procedure that
allowed direct actions, and the public policy of Mississippi was to prohibit direct
actions.'84 Therefore, under Mississippi conflict of laws rules, courts prohibited
applying the Louisiana direct action statute.18 The Eakins I decision implied that
Mississippi procedure and public policy may be more open to direct actions in
the future, which would lessen the conflict between Mississippi law and foreign
direct action statutes. After Eakins II, however, there seems to be no reason to
depart from the established approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Eakins I decision drastically changed long standing legal precedent in
Mississippi that prohibited third parties from bringing direct actions against
insurance companies. The Eakins I court purportedly limited the direct actions it
would be willing to allow to declaratory judgment proceedings, although the
court overruled earlier cases that had prohibited any type of direct actions against
insurance companies. The court reasoned that a declaratory judgment proceed-
ing joining the insurer would promote judicial economy. Although the Eakins I
decision was the law of direct actions in Mississippi for a brief period, the deci-
sion was ultimately overturned by the decision in Eakins II. Eakins II appears to
return the law of direct actions to the state in which it existed before Eakins I.
However, the narrow margin of the Eakins II decision leaves open the possibility
of a return to the Eakins I direct actions rule in the future.
182. See Cook v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 128 So. 2d 363 (Miss. 1961); McArthur v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
186 So. 305 (Miss. 1939).
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If Mississippi is to adopt direct actions, it should not return to the approach in
Eakins L The court in Eakins I was dealing with a garnishment proceeding and
changed Mississippi's long standing prohibition of direct actions in what was
apparently dicta. If Mississippi is to allow direct actions, the legislature should
enact a statute so that the scope of direct action law in Mississippi can be clearly
defined.

